In 2012, Singh and Verma proposed an ID-based 
Introduction
The digital signature scheme with message recovery was first introduced by Nyberg and Ruppel [1] in 1993. In such a scheme, the original message of the signature is not required to be transmitted together with the signature since it can be recovered from the signature by the receiver. It is very suitable for small message to be signed or bandwidth to be one of the main concerns.
In 1984, Shamir [2] proposed the concept of ID-based cryptography. In this paradigm of cryptography, a user's identifier information such as his/her name, e-mail address or IP address can be used as a public key. Thus it simplifies the key management and removes the necessity of public key certificates.
Proxy signature was first proposed by Mambo et al. [3] in 1996, which allows a designated person, called proxy signer, to sign on behalf of an original signer on the message m. The proxy signature scheme plays an important role in many practical applications and has been received great attention after it was proposed. Proxy signature schemes can be used in distributed shared object systems [4] , grid computing [5] , mobile agent applications [6] and global distribution networks [7] , etc.
In 2012, Singh and Verma [8] proposed an ID-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery, which combines the merits of ID-based signature scheme and signature scheme with message recovery, and they proved their scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen message and ID attack. However, in this paper, we disprove their claim and show that their scheme is forgeable, and that anyone after getting a valid proxy signature can forge another proxy signature with any message under the same original signer and proxy signer. Meanwhile, we point out a security flaw in their proof. After that, we propose an improved scheme that remedies the weakness of Singh and Verma's scheme, and give the security proof of our improved scheme.
Proxy signature with message recovery can have many practical applications in real life. For example, a person wants to buy some goods or services on the Internet. There is a lot of work to do to find the suitable goods or services, so he/she will delegate a mobile
Related Work
To categorize delegation types, Mambo, et al. [3] defined three levels of delegations: (1) Full delegation. The original signer gives his secret key to the proxy signer. The proxy signer uses the key to sign documents. So, it has the main weakness that the proxy signature cannot be distinguishable from the original signer's signature. (2) Partial delegation. The original signer generates a proxy signature key from its private key and gives it to the proxy signer. The proxy signer uses the proxy key to sign. However, the proxy signer can abuse his delegated rights because partial delegation does not restrict the proxy signer's signing capability. (3) Delegation by warrant. The original signer signs the warrant which describes relative rights and information of the original signer and proxy signer. The final proxy signature includes two parts: one is the signed warrant, and another is the proxy signature produced by the proxy signer. So the verifier must verify two signatures, which increases the amount of calculation. Later, Kim et al. [9] proposed a new kind of proxy signature: partial delegation with warrant. This kind of proxy signature combines the benefits of both the partial delegation and the delegation by warrant. So this delegation has fast processing speed and is appropriate for the restricting documents to be signed. Since then, most work on proxy signature schemes has focused on this type of proxy signature.
To restrict the power of the proxy signer, in 1997, Kim et al. [9] and Zhang [10] proposed the threshold proxy signature. A (t,n) threshold proxy signature scheme is a variant of the proxy signature scheme in which the proxy signature key is shared by a group of n proxy signers in such a way that any t or more proxy signers can cooperatively employ the proxy signature key to sign messages on behalf of an original signer, but t -1 or fewer proxy signers cannot. In 2000, Hwang et al. [11] proposed the concept of multiproxy signature, in such a scheme, an original signer can delegate his signing capability to a proxy group and only the cooperation of all members of the group can generate a proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. In the same year, Yi et al. [12] proposed the concept of proxy multi-signature, in such a scheme, a group of original signers can delegate their signing capability to a proxy signer. In 2001, Hwang et al. [13] proposed the concept of multi-proxy multi-signature, in such a scheme, a group of original signers can delegate their signing capabilities to a group of proxy signers. In 2003, Li et al. [14] proposed the concept of threshold proxy threshold signature, in which original signers can cooperatively delegate the signing capabilities to a group of proxy signers, and In addition, proxy signature can combine other special signatures to obtain some new types of proxy signature, such as designated verifier proxy signature [15] , proxy blind signature [16] , forward security proxy signature [17] , ID-based proxy signature [18] and certificateless proxy signature [19] et al.
The first work on proxy signature in the provable security direction was done by Boldyreva et al. [20] 
Security Model of ID-based Proxy Signature Scheme with Message Recovery
We consider the security model described in Singh and Verma [8] , in which an adversary A which is assumed to be a probabilistic Turing machine, takes as input the global scheme parameters and a random tape and performs an experiment, as described below. Definition 1. For an ID-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery (IDPSWM), we define an experiment 
This oracle takes as input the proxy signer's identity ID and a delegation W and outputs a proxy signing key 
is a bilinear pairing. 
is the global public key of PKG and q is a prime. , where 
A Forgery Attack on Singh and Verma's Scheme
In this section, we show that the Singh and Verma's scheme is vulnerable to the forgery attack. An adversary can forge a valid proxy signature for any message with knowing a previous valid proxy signature. Assume that 
The following equations show that the proxy signature
is a valid proxy signature, so 
The Security Flaw in the Proof of Singh and Verma's Scheme
In the proof of Singh and Verma's ID-based proxy signature scheme, they referenced the proof of Gu and Zhu [27] , and they defined a generic digital signature scheme with message recovery, called IDWM. They stated if an attacker A could forge a valid IDbased proxy signature with message recovery of their scheme, the challenger B could forge a valid signature of IDWM. Because IDWM scheme was a generic digital signature, based on the forking lemma [28] , B could produce two valid signatures, which makes B compute aQ on input of any given * 1 , , G Q aP P  . Thus, their scheme was proved. Here, we must point out that forking lemma requires a generic digital signature scheme. Namely, by given the input message m , it produces triples ) and the message m , so their IDWM scheme is not a generic digital signature scheme, and the forking lemma is not suitable for it, meaning that their proof is wrong.
An Improved Scheme

The Scheme
Singh and Verma's scheme referenced the scheme of Zhang et al. [29] . In the original paper of Zhang 
, so, we obtain: T , and gets return 1 by non-negligible probability  . Then there is an adversary B, who can succeed in existential forgery of Hess's scheme [30] with probability at least  . (Hess's identity-based signature scheme is proved to be existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen message and ID attack in [30] )
Proof of the Theorem. From A, we can construct an adversary B of Hess's scheme, who can succeed in existential forgery with probability at least  . (1) To prove the theorem, we can do the same as Gu and Zhu [27] , and Singh and Verma [8] . That is, we can define a generic digital signature scheme with message recovery, called IDWM-NEW as follows:  KeyGen. Given a security parameter N   , generates the key pair as follows: , and the private key of the signer, and so the IDWM-NEW is a generic digital signature scheme and forking lemma is suitable for it. We can use the same method to prove our improved scheme as Gu and Zhu [27] , and Singh and Verma [8] .
Proof of the Theorem. 
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. So, B can output aQ . Thus the theorem is proved.
Efficiency Analysis
Since computation time and ciphertext size are two important factors affecting the efficiency, we present the comparison with respect to them. Table 1 shows the comparison. We denote by M a scalar multiplication in 1 G , by E an exponentiation in 2 G , by e the pairing computation.
From Table 1 , it is clear that the full length of our message signature pair is the same as the original one, and less than other schemes considered, i.e., it is providing the benefit of being a message recovery signature scheme. In delegation phase, Xu et al. [31] is the most efficient one and the other schemes are almost the same. In delegation verification phase, Gu and Zhu [32] is the most efficient one because it only needs one pairing computation, and Xu et al. is the most inefficient one because it needs three pairing computations. In proxy key generation phase all schemes are the same. In proxy signing phase, our improved scheme and Zhang and Kim [33] need one more operation than the other three schemes. In signature verification phase, Gu and Zhu [32] is the most efficient one because it only needs one pairing computation, and Xu et al. [31] is the most inefficient one because it needs five pairing computations.
The improved scheme adds one scalar multiplication in Proxy Signing phase and one exponentiation in Signature Verification phase, comparing with the original one. To sum up, our improved scheme is of high efficiency. 
